<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>CVE on THALIUM</title><link>/tags/cve/</link><description>Recent content in CVE on THALIUM</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><copyright>Copyright (c) 2026, all rights reserved.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Mon, 25 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="/tags/cve/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Rooting Xiaomi WiFi Routers</title><link>/posts/rooting-xiaomi-wifi-routers/</link><pubDate>Mon, 25 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/rooting-xiaomi-wifi-routers/</guid><description>In this article, we discuss our research approach for investigating Xiaomi routers. We discovered multiple vulnerabilities allowing Remote Code Execution (RCE) on several models, through both LAN and WAN interfaces. This work led to the publication of four CVEs specifically targeting Xiaomi routers.</description></item><item><title>Leveraging Android Permissions: A Solver Approach</title><link>/posts/leveraging-android-permissions/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/leveraging-android-permissions/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The Android permission management system has already suffered from several vulnerabilities in the past. Such weaknesses can grant dangerous permissions to a malevolent application, an example being &lt;code&gt;CALL_LOG&lt;/code&gt;, which gives access to all incoming and outgoing calls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This post dives into the Android permission system and how a solver was leveraged to find new vulnerabilities. With this approach, a privilege escalation was identified, which was fixed and assigned CVE-2023-20947 by Google.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>The Fuzzing Guide to the Galaxy: An Attempt with Android System Services</title><link>/posts/fuzzing-samsung-system-services/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/fuzzing-samsung-system-services/</guid><description>Although the Android base is open source, many different constructors customize it with their own UIs and APIs. All these additions represent an extra attack surface that can change from one phone model to another. We tried to automatically fuzz the closed-source system services powering these modifications, discovering &lt;code&gt;CVE-2022-39907&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;CVE-2022-39908&lt;/code&gt; along the way.</description></item><item><title>Fuzzing RDPEGFX with "what the fuzz"</title><link>/posts/rdpegfx/</link><pubDate>Fri, 14 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/rdpegfx/</guid><description>Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) client was fuzzed by various teams in the past few years, it thus seemed like a good target to try a recent snapshot fuzzer: &lt;a href="https://github.com/0vercl0k/wtf"&gt;what the fuzz (wtf)&lt;/a&gt; (of which we are only users). In this companion post to our &lt;a href="https://www.hexacon.fr/conference/speakers/#fuzzing_rdpegfx"&gt;Hexacon 2022 talk&lt;/a&gt; (&lt;a href="/posts/misc/rdpegfx/Hexacon2022-Fuzzing_RDPEGFX_with_wtf.pdf"&gt;slides&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://youtu.be/4pftjmKqeoM"&gt;video&lt;/a&gt;) we’ll show how we took advantage of wtf flexibility in order to efficiently fuzz the RDPEGFX channel of Microsoft RDP client and uncover &lt;a href="https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30221"&gt;CVE-2022-30221&lt;/a&gt;.</description></item><item><title>Remote Deserialization Bug in Microsoft's RDP Client through Smart Card Extension (CVE-2021-38666)</title><link>/posts/deserialization-bug-through-rdp-smart-card-extension/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Dec 2021 06:00:01 +0100</pubDate><guid>/posts/deserialization-bug-through-rdp-smart-card-extension/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This is the &lt;strong&gt;third installment&lt;/strong&gt; in my three-part series of articles on fuzzing Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s RDP client, where I explain a bug I found by fuzzing the &lt;strong&gt;smart card extension&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Remote ASLR Leak in Microsoft's RDP Client through Printer Cache Registry (CVE-2021-38665)</title><link>/posts/leaking-aslr-through-rdp-printer-cache-registry/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Dec 2021 06:00:00 +0100</pubDate><guid>/posts/leaking-aslr-through-rdp-printer-cache-registry/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This is the &lt;strong&gt;second installment&lt;/strong&gt; in my three-part series of articles on fuzzing Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s RDP client. I will explain a bug I found by fuzzing the &lt;strong&gt;printer sub-protocol&lt;/strong&gt;, and how I exploited it.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Fuzzing Microsoft's RDP Client using Virtual Channels: Overview &amp; Methodology</title><link>/posts/fuzzing-microsoft-rdp-client-using-virtual-channels/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Nov 2021 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/posts/fuzzing-microsoft-rdp-client-using-virtual-channels/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This article begins my three-part series on fuzzing Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s RDP client. In this &lt;strong&gt;first installment&lt;/strong&gt;, I set up a methodology for &lt;strong&gt;fuzzing Virtual Channels&lt;/strong&gt; using WinAFL and share some of my findings.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>